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The Pleasurable Pain of Melancholic Solitude: 
Examining Rousseau’s Emotional Self-Indulgence in Reveries of the Solitary Walker 
The Romantic period is largely defined by the emphasis it places on the sensibilities of 
the individual. Developing from the sentimentalism of the mid-eighteenth century, and its 
appreciation of the value of emotion as a necessary balance to intellect and reason, the Romantic 
period further privileged the inner world of the individual. The evolution of the Romantic 
solitary thinker, however, is reflective of an important revaluation of emotion detached from 
public service and redirected toward the fulfillment of the self. Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s pre-
Romantic text, Reveries of the Solitary Walker, offers a crucial bridge between sentimental and 
Romantic modes of thought, illustrating how a famous man’s retreat from society provides a 
space for the reveries and reflections of the individual mind. Throughout the text, Rousseau 
repeatedly expresses and expands on the profound feeling of what we might call melancholic 
solitude: a condition resulting from the experience of his partly forced, partly self-imposed exile. 
At its strongest, this emotionally-driven form of solitary existence, accentuated by physical 
isolation and the pleasurable presence of nature, involves experiences of the profound that results 
from an inward turn to the self. The Rousseau of Reveries is an emotional, expressive, almost 
naïve individual whose initial feelings of alienation are transformed into a blissful state of 
pleasure. This change results in the sheer enjoyment of the simple existence he has found 
through indulging himself in memories, and through the tranquil, peaceful experience of real 
solitude. The aimless tangents of Rousseau’s Reveries embody the Romantic privileging of the 
emotive self with all its apparent contradictions. In Reveries, Rousseau presents himself simply 
as a man, with all his contradictions, flaws and nuances appropriately expressed through his 
integrally aimless writing. Plunged into melancholy, and reveling in the beauty of nature (as 
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especially evident in his “Fifth Walk”), Rousseau reflects on the melancholic solitude that 
liberates his being. Through the inwardly focused indulgence of reverie, Rousseau’s reveries 
allow him to perceive transcendental, and sometimes even divine, properties in his own 
existence. 
The emotive experiences of Reveries can best be understood through the Romantics’ 
understanding of melancholy. Although melancholy’s historical relevance dates to the four 
humours of ancient Greece and its association to “black bile,” it was not until the development of 
the idea of the individual that its emotional properties began to be examined in a more proto-
psychological sense. As Clark Lawlor explains in his historical account of the subject, “the 
second half of the eighteenth century began to regard the life of the emotion as having a 
significance equal to the life of the reasoning mind” (84). And yet, as Lawlor insists, the 
phenomenon of melancholy was progressively seen as a symptom of an increasingly civilized 
European society; bored, privileged men such as Rousseau – “sons of idleness” who “do no 
meaningful work” – “rely on continuous dissipation to defeat the insupportable tediousness of an 
inactive life and kill time by pleasure” (90). In this sense, melancholy was often perceived as a 
useless, even detrimental condition that came into existence as a result of European luxury. By 
the Romantic period, however, such uselessness was becoming celebrated for the tremendous 
insight into the evolving human condition that it revealed. “The increased focus on the self,” 
Lawlor writes, “as opposed to the civic and social responsibilities of the earlier period, meant 
that Romantic melancholy intensified the idea of this disease as a marker of self-reflection, 
permitting contemplation of the deepest aspects of existence, and generally typifying creative 
genius” (98). The Romantic period permitted a self-indulgence that would have likely been met 
with harsh criticism in the past, with the symptoms of melancholy being perceived more as a 
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disease. While the term self-indulgence would have connoted a negative response from earlier 
generations, the Romantics saw it as a gateway to self-knowledge. Rousseau’s Reveries is a 
testament to such cultural revaluations. As such, the solitary self-indulgence of Rousseau’s 
reclusive sufferer in search of internal peace comes to be esteemed as a respectable form of 
emotional intelligence.   
 To discuss the melancholic solitude at the heart of Rousseau’s text, it is important to 
define the often-distorted concept of melancholy, not as a clinical term, but as an emotional 
experience. Perhaps the most problematic popular conception of melancholy is that it is 
synonymous with depression. While melancholy can include negative sentiments, it is a much 
more complex, multifaceted state, with a wider range of possible feelings than merely 
pessimistic depression. As Emily Brady classifies it, melancholy has a “dual nature” different 
from the rawer pain of depression and other simple emotions. Melancholy is not simply “a 
debilitating mood”; “its reflective or thoughtful aspect” make melancholy “somehow 
productive . . . for it provides an opportunity for indulgent self-reflection. We enjoy this time out 
for reflection, but the pleasure is also connected to recollecting that which we long for, where 
this reflective element can be even exhilarating or uplifting.” The apparent productivity of 
melancholy’s self-reflective indulgences is what creates its potential to be pleasurable. As an 
emotion, its sentimental nature calls for a turn away from the external world and toward the self, 
where one can revel in pleasurable memories and overcome the limitations of other “raw” 
emotions through a reflective and detached perspective. As Rousseau suggests, this type of 
emotion “becomes so captivating that we eventually come to regard it as the height of happiness” 
(88). By contrast, searching for happiness through an external source reveals that “there’s 
nothing solid there for the heart to attach itself to. Thus our earthly joys are almost without 
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exception creatures of a moment” (88). Because “[e]verything is in constant flux on this earth”, 
one should not depend on anything external to provide long-term happiness, for it is bound to 
change from the form that brought the most pleasure, be it another person or a positive sentiment 
to a specific object (Rousseau 88). Accordingly, melancholy is not a pleasure that associates 
itself with any physical object; rather, it is a feeling of the divine and sublime within. By simply 
existing with it, a flow of tranquil happiness and uplifting peace can be felt coursing through the 
soul. With simple emotions, such as joy or sadness, one feels a certain way about an external 
source that is attached to the outside world; the pleasure of melancholy, however, has no external 
association; it simply results from a state of mind brought about by solitary reflection.    
Although melancholic solitude is mainly an experience resulting in tranquil pleasure, pain 
plays an important role in facilitating it, as reflected in Rousseau’s exile leading up to the writing 
of Reveries. Brady’s notion of melancholy as “a mature emotion in which reflection calms a 
turbulent soul” reflects its healing power, which explains its role in helping Rousseau overcome 
the misery of exile. For Rousseau, the alienation he must have felt initially upon his exile worked 
to trouble him enough emotionally that he turned to his imagination and reveries. This apparent 
inclination for the hurt soul to seek pleasure in the familiar explains Rousseau’s new-found 
passion for botany (which he discusses in the “Seventh Walk”), a hobby that keeps his mind 
busy and with which he can further immerse himself in the natural world he seems to adore. 
Throughout Reveries, Rousseau continuously fends off despair by indulging in the pleasures of 
melancholic solitude. In this manner, the involuntary solitude of his exile is transformed into a 
pleasurable retirement. As Michael Bell suggests, Rousseau’s melancholy is in many ways a 
direct result of his initial rejection by society: “the underlying precondition is his social isolation; 
only his outcast state has made this experience and its accompanying insights available to him” 
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(151). Without the initial pain that settles one’s mind into a melancholic mood, the pleasures that 
come from indulging in this emotion would never come. 
While Rousseau discusses his natural inclination to seek pleasure inwardly in multiple 
Walks, it is in the “Fifth Walk,” when he reflects on the Island of Saint-Pierre, that he appears at 
his most confident and enlightened. He writes: “Complete silence induces melancholy; it is an 
image of death. In such cases the assistance of a happy imagination is needed, and it comes 
naturally to those whom Heaven has blessed with it” (Rousseau 90). Melancholy possesses the 
mind with such a powerful tranquility that Rousseau likens it to the profound quiet of death, in a 
state that is detached from external existence and inspires the imagination to provide pleasurable 
reveries. While experiencing this comatose sense of peace, the imagination can abandon the 
objects and perceptions of the exterior world in favor of an inner, death-like quiet through which 
one can retreat from worldly pain. In his introduction to the Reveries, Peter France argues that 
the very writing of the book is likely done by Rousseau to console himself from the pain of his 
exile: “it is as if Rousseau were building himself a refuge from the attacks of others and from his 
own fears and doubts” (14). Beyond its purpose as a sort of diary-like refuge for Rousseau, 
Reveries is compellingly free and apparently purposeless. And yet, the text’s repetitive and, at 
times, self-contradictory nature, only adds to the importance of the book’s embracement of 
useless reverie as a rejection of worldly reason.  
Written over a century earlier than Reveries, John Milton’s poem “Il Penseroso” offers 
the groundwork for the pensive, solitary figure that Rousseau would in many ways eventually 
embody by poetically expressing the experience of melancholic solitude. Rousseau further 
develops the more general, depersonalized poetic figure Milton had originally established by 
providing the context of his own lived experience. Taken together, the two works can be used to 
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examine the effects of melancholy in more purposeful, personal detail. While Milton’s poem 
provides an introspective account of a pensive solitary figure’s aesthetic search for self-
knowledge, it is missing the key framework of the human individual, whose memories, 
aspirations, and emotional responses, are essential to consider in order to fully explore the effects 
of melancholic solitude. The writings of an expressive individual such as Rousseau are, 
therefore, much more valuable in understanding the experience of melancholic solitude, however 
less focused and deliberate they may be. Milton’s poem is wholly invested in establishing a 
paradoxically gloomy yet appealing solitary atmosphere, “[f]ar from all resort of Mirth,” in 
which the reflective pursuits of melancholy can thrive (81). The mood of Milton’s poem is 
consistently tranquil and ultimately pleasurable, creating a figure whose feelings are difficult to 
access and relate to. Yet it must be noted that Milton was a Renaissance writer, and the 
individualism and free-floating introspection privileged by the Romantics is clearly absent from 
“Il Penseroso.” For this reason, Milton’s speaker is limited in expressing the melancholic 
experience. Because he is simply a rhetorical poetic figure, rather than an emotionally complex 
individual whose retreat from society is the result of real life challenges, Milton’s poem falls 
short of exemplifying the complex nature of melancholic solitude depicted by Rousseau’s 
Reveries. 
To understand how exactly Rousseau achieves his state of melancholic solitude requires 
examining the nature of what he calls “reverie”: a sort of daydreaming that, existing outside the 
realm of thought, is an emotional indulgence of the imagination with the ultimate purpose of 
providing pleasure for the self. Rousseau best defines the experience of his own reveries in the 
“Seventh Walk,” where he directly contrasts it with logical thought:  
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…reverie amuses and distracts me, thought wearies and depresses me; thinking has 
always been for me a disagreeable and thankless occupation. Sometimes my reveries end 
in meditation, but more often my meditations end in reverie, and during these wanderings 
my soul roams and soars through the universe on the wings of imagination, in ecstasies 
which surpass all other pleasures (107).  
As Rousseau suggests, thought is filled with too much intention and purpose to be pleasant, 
while reverie operates outside of this limited focus. The relationship between thought and reverie 
directly parallels the differences between depression and melancholy discussed earlier: while 
thought is focused around a specific topic – one thinks inevitably about something – reverie is 
unrestricted because of its very purposelessness beyond the self-interests of the individual. For 
Rousseau, this is fundamental to its usefulness in providing pleasure: “everything that concerns 
my needs saddens and sours my thoughts, and I never found any real charm in the pleasures of 
the mind unless I was able to forget all about the interests of the body” (111). Melancholy is, 
therefore, the ideal emotional state to partake in the pleasures of reverie as they both depend on 
pure self-indulgence and a disregard for the useful.  
Rousseau uses reverie to interact with memories; however, in doing so he is essentially 
rejecting reality and living in an imaginary and possibly illusory world of his fancy. In discussing 
this potential problem, Bell argues: “The only fitting location for the romantic longing is the 
realm of the aesthetic understood now as representing a mode of contemplation explicitly 
opposed to life. In this tradition, the romantic emotion constantly acknowledges its illusory status 
in the self-consciousness of the fiction as fiction” (153). In many ways, melancholic solitude can 
lead to a self-conscious retreat from reality. While this may seem potentially problematic, if 
melancholy’s primary functions are the overcoming of pain and an indulgence in self-
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knowledge, then this turn to illusion seems entirely necessary. Indeed, melancholic solitude may 
even seem selfish, especially considering the socially aware and involved figure that Rousseau 
was in his earlier life. Yet, focusing on morality and self-deception as problems in this context 
threatens to devalue the self-therapy and psychological relief achieved by “giv[ing] [himself] 
over entirely to the pleasure of conversing with [his] soul” (Rousseau 32). What Rousseau 
accomplished with Reveries is a valuation of the possibilities of the imagination. He does not 
intend to present, however, this fantasy as an alternative to reality, but as a means to enhance the 
experience of one’s own existence in the emerging realm of the self. Through reverie, Rousseau 
is “finding the beatific in an escape from time . . . [h]is past is an inexhaustible well” (Bell 152). 
It is precisely because the imaginary exists outside of time and place that melancholic solitude 
affords Rousseau an infinite source of pleasure.  
The capacity of melancholic solitude to divorce the individual from time and place 
connects it with the analogous emotional experience of the sublime. Although the sublime differs 
in intensity to melancholy, it is part of the same kind of emotional feeling, and examining one 
experience can shed light on the workings of the other. Frances Ferguson theorizes that “we react 
with dread and awe to what is sublime because of its appearing greater than we are, for being 
more, and making us acknowledge its power” (8-9). The sublime’s fixation on what is greater 
than the self proves especially useful in considering the associations between melancholic 
solitude and the divine that both Rousseau and Milton take note of. The sublime shares 
melancholy’s disregard for external, physical objects, as well as “a commitment to self and self-
preservation” and an interest in the profound (Ferguson 8). While the pleasure of melancholic 
solitude is a constant feeling that comes from the simplicity of the existence it provides, the 
sublime is concerned with a more epiphanic acknowledgment of a power greater than the self: a 
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power not unlike God. Milton introduces the connection between melancholy and the divine 
early in “Il Penseroso”: “Hail divinest Melancholy, / Whose saintly visage is too bright / To hit 
the sense of human sight” (12-15). While there is no strict correlation between melancholic 
solitude and godliness, for religious believers such as Milton and Rousseau, the association 
between the tranquil, enlightening emotion and conceptions of the divine is only natural. 
Rousseau comments that the happiness granted in this state comes from “nothing external to us, 
nothing apart from ourselves or our own existence; as long as this state lasts we are self-
sufficient like God” (89). By abandoning all external attachments, Rousseau believes one can 
achieve a state of being so free from the chains of society that we become profoundly God-like 
beings ourselves, having nothing and desiring nothing outside of the pleasure of simply existing. 
Where the force of the sublime experience violently shatters the individual ego, the force of 
melancholy comes from a liberating disassociation from that which is individual. In this sense, 
the prolonged simplicity of melancholic solitude achieves a result that is similar to the shocking 
sublimity of perceiving something greater, even though the two provide fundamentally unique 
epiphanic experiences. 
Ultimately, Rousseau’s reflective journey is more tranquilly melancholic than explosively 
sublime, and at one point he indirectly addresses his preference for the former when considering 
his problem with the more intense experience that the sublime is associated with: “These brief 
moments of madness and passion, however powerfully they may affect us, can because of this 
very power only be infrequent points along the line of our life . . . and the happiness for which 
my soul longs is not made up of fleeting moments, but of a single and lasting state” (87). Despite 
their similar natures, the experience of melancholy as opposed to sublimity is ultimately quite 
different. Rousseau finds peace in melancholy’s easy, constant state, a pleasure that comes 
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simply from existing and needing nothing else. But in terms of perceiving the divine, melancholy 
and sublimity offer opposing means of locating God. While sublimity can bring one to appreciate 
and awe at His higher power above all things in a theistic sense, melancholy is more interested in 
the deistic view of God. The tranquil ease of melancholic solitude allows Rousseau to feel a 
presence existing in and among all creation, a oneness which locates God closer to the self. As 
he suggests, the sensitive soul, in a “blissful state of self-abandonment . . . loses himself in the 
immensity of this beautiful order, with which he feels himself at one. All individual objects 
escape him; he sees and feels nothing but the unity of all things” (Rousseau 108). This passage 
describes a dissolution of the physical self, and a mental, even spiritual, liberation of the self into 
the consciousness of a being that many believers would call God. Milton parallels this sentiment 
toward the end of his poem, calling on Melancholy to “Dissolve [him] into ecstasies, / And bring 
all heaven before [his] eyes” (165-166). In the same way that a melancholic solitary such as 
Rousseau or the speaker of “Il Penseroso” achieves a self-sufficient state resembling godliness, 
the experience of melancholy itself becomes a sort of tranquil Romantic heaven that exists 
entirely within the mind, and in which everything is joined in oneness. Rousseau sums up the 
feeling of this heavenly space in the “Fifth Walk”: 
a state where the soul can establish itself and concentrate its entire being . . . where time 
is nothing to it . . . and no other feelings of deprivation or enjoyment, pleasure or pain, 
desire or fear than the simple feeling of existence, a feeling that fills our soul entirely, as 
long as this state lasts we can call ourselves happy, not with a poor, incomplete and 
relative happiness such as we find in the pleasures of life, but with a sufficient, complete 
and perfect happiness which leaves no emptiness to be filled in the soul. (88) 
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Despite owing itself to an external environment that triggers the complex emotion, the realm of 
melancholy is a place that, paradoxically, has no presence in the physical world. Melancholy’s 
detachment from all things physical – which are in turn temporary – ensures that it can sustain 
itself as a constant source of pleasure. 
 Given the paradoxical nature of melancholic solitude, one of the most complex and 
important considerations is the role of actual physical isolation in producing the necessary 
feeling. The necessity of mental detachment from the external world to create a space for internal 
solitude to function is clear enough. However, opinions on the importance of physical 
detachment in facilitating the emotion, and the idea of the ideal melancholic space, vary greatly. 
Michel de Montaigne, in his influential essay “Of Solitude,” explains solitude as fundamentally 
internal. Its power, he insists, comes from unburdening the soul of worldly attachments: “it is not 
enough to have gotten away from the crowd, it is not enough to move; we must get away from 
the gregarious instincts that are inside us, we must sequester ourselves and repossess ourselves” 
(213). Furthermore, Montaigne emphasizes that solitude can be experienced without physical 
isolation: “Therefore we must bring [the soul] back and withdraw it into itself: that is the real 
solitude, which may be enjoyed in the midst of cities and the courts of kings; but it is enjoyed 
more handily alone” (214). Rousseau follows Montaigne’s line of thinking by suggesting that 
“[t]his type of [melancholic] reverie can be enjoyed anywhere where one is undisturbed” (90). 
Rousseau’s only apparent precondition, therefore, for indulging in reverie seems to be finding 
any space where external elements are not interfering. In considering Reveries, Michael Bell 
refers to this same idea of a space comprising only of the bare minimum through a metaphor 
likening the melancholic space to a cell: “the only place in which he can experience the passion 
to which he is nonetheless committed is the antechamber to eternity represented by the cell . . . 
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[f]or him, the world inside the cell has more reality than the everyday world outside” (153). The 
metaphorical cell to which Rousseau retreats in Reveries can, therefore, be understood in 
accordance with his self-imposed exile, done to get away from his problems with society and to 
enter a space where the self is the only real presence. This cell does not necessarily need to 
contain anything other than the solitary figure inhabiting it. In other words, the bar minimum 
required for melancholic contemplation is no more than a space drained of everything else: an 
empty cell. Milton’s pensive figure speaks favorably of dark, black, night-like spaces: a “mossy 
cell” or “some still removèd place . . . Where glowing embers through the room / Teach light to 
counterfeit a gloom” (78-80, 169). The cell that offers peace of mind and an atmosphere 
“removed” from external disturbances is, therefore, the only requirement for experiencing the 
effects of melancholic solitude. The cell’s total emptiness can then be personalized, in a sense, 
filled with whatever aesthetic preference the solitary individual draws pleasure from – whether it 
be a dark, gloomy room or the grand expanse of nature. 
 The idea of nature as a popular space for melancholic introspection can be found in 
countless Romantic texts. The natural world is often seen as a logical retreat to reflect upon the 
nature of the self. While Rousseau himself hardly addresses the importance of nature in helping 
him achieve his state of melancholic solitude, the natural world’s apparent significance can be 
found all throughout Reveries, from his fascination with botany to his profound experience on 
the Island of Saint-Pierre, where he indulges in the spectacle of nature. Focusing on the personal 
importance that nature holds for Rousseau, Prabhu Venkataraman argues: “Throughout his life 
nature has served as his mirror for self-examination; it acts as a trigger for various memoires, it 
provides a harmonious setting for delving into the more painful of these memoires, and allows 
him to extract insights that enable him to face his mortality” (327). Rousseau has a specific idea 
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of nature, which includes the “[t]rees, bushes, and plants” that he calls “the clothing and 
adornment of the earth,” rather than the “bare, barren countryside that presents the eyes with 
nothing but stones, mud and sand” (108). In ways that redouble Rousseau’s interest in botany, 
his version of nature is therefore selective toward the greenery of plant life, further emphasizing 
that it is not the natural world itself that helps induce melancholy, but whatever aesthetic 
environment offers the most pleasurable associations for the individual. Put simply, there is no 
objectively superior environment to be found; the importance hinges on subjective associations 
tied to memories and feelings from the soul, and the popular appearance of nature in Romantic 
writing can, in many cases, be attributed to the many positive experiences people have in 
admiring its beauty.  
 The positive experience Rousseau derives from nature is best exemplified in the “Fifth 
Walk.” The chapter is filled with Romantic descriptions of the island’s natural environment and 
of a total tranquility that works only to support his melancholic solitude. He experiences a 
particularly profound sensory experience by the “edge of the lake”: 
there the noise of the waves and the movement of the water, taking hold of my senses and 
driving all other agitation from my soul, would plunge it into a delicious reverie in which 
night often stole upon me unawares. The ebb and flow of the water, its continuous yet 
undulating noise, kept lapping against my ears and my eyes, taking the place of all the 
inward movements which my reverie had calmed within me, and it was enough to make 
me pleasurably aware of my existence, without troubling myself with thought. (Rousseau 
86-87) 
While the natural phenomenon of the waves appears to impose itself on Rousseau’s senses, it is 
not in any way problematic for the melancholic experience because he is still essentially 
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“undisturbed” by the experience. As Bell observes, “the regular sound of the waters occupies and 
lulls his senses,” rather than distracting him, “and connects him to the outside world without 
intruding on his inner calm and absorption” (151). While the sights and sounds are external, the 
regularity and continuousness of the sensory experience deprives it of the jarring nature of a 
sudden sublime surprise. Accordingly, the waves work to enhance Rousseau’s melancholy, as 
they contribute to the steady self-awareness of his fantastical reverie and enable easy entrance 
into the timeless, formless space of imagination. This perception of the ebb and flow of the water 
exemplifies the nature of Rousseau’s solitary “cell,” providing a feeling of self-knowledge 
regarding his existence without enough external focus that it would encourage reason or thought, 
which, in turn, would inevitably break the spell of melancholy. While the external triggering 
mechanisms are distinct for both, the transcendental nature of Rousseau’s melancholic 
experience is not unlike that of the sublime. As Ferguson notes: “The experience of sublime 
pleasure in nature is seen, in other words, as transcendental because of its not needing to be 
taught, and indeed because of the way in which the construction of the lesson plan for that 
learning is itself unimaginable” (4). Although it is important not to forget the differences 
between melancholy and sublimity, Ferguson’s notion here applies to both profound experiences. 
The self-knowledge to be discovered from melancholic solitude and the experience of reverie is a 
sort of learning that is unimaginable until one is in the correct state of mind, and for Rousseau, 
the natural world acts as a gate to help enter that introspective space. 
 With Reveries of the Solitary Walker, Rousseau escapes the chains of society by 
retreating into a state of melancholic solitude: an emotional state that helps him escape the pain 
of his exile and find peace with his own self. Rousseau’s text provides a significant look forward 
to the inward turn of Romantic epistemology, providing a deep, diary-like access into an 
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individual’s complex relationship to melancholy. Indulging his emotions, Rousseau feeds off 
reveries that provide an endless source of pleasure, reaching into feelings of the past and the 
beauty of the natural world that surrounds him, while ultimately heightening the profound 
properties of the simple existence he has taken on. Rousseau’s Reveries, and especially the 
compelling “Fifth Walk,” is a tremendously useful text for examining the transition from 
sentimentalism to Romanticism during the latter half of the eighteenth century: a transition 
marked by deeply reflective, personal accounts of the emotional phenomenon of melancholic 
solitude. 
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Abstract 
 Rousseau’s Reveries of the Solitary Walker celebrates self-indulgent emotion through the 
seemingly paradoxical state of melancholic solitude. Although useless in terms of its impact on 
the world, melancholy is a complex emotion with a deep introspective nature that can lead to the 
simultaneous indulgence in, and effacement of, the self. While Rousseau’s melancholic state can 
be understood as a retreat from the painful trials and tribulations of the public world, his self-
imposed solitude encourages peace specifically through the inwardly focused indulgence of 
“reverie,” a seemingly purposeless solitary rumination encouraging self-knowledge. This essay 
explores the personal and pseudo-divine nature of Rousseau’s self-effacing reveries to consider 
how melancholic solitude and self-imposed exile function together, not merely as an act of 
selfishness, but as an essential pathway for experiencing a pseudo-divine form of existence. 
Rousseau’s intense emotional self-indulgence feeds off these reveries, providing an endless 
source of pleasure by exploring feelings and significant memories that are triggered by the 
beauty of the natural world. The natural world serves as a trigger for stimulating Rousseau’s 
melancholic reveries, thereby indicating the importance of a subjectively significant physical 
atmosphere to enhance an otherwise wholly internal experience. The combination of mental 
detachment from the external world with actual physical isolation – in an inspirational aesthetic 
environment – enables the solitary individual to achieve the ecstatic sense of enlightenment 
possible from the most intense form of melancholy. Rousseau’s solitary contemplations 
ultimately heighten the profoundly introspective properties of the simple existence that he 
celebrates in Reveries. 
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